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Abstract
We investigate endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly consisting of a single public firm
and foreign competitors and compare the results with those in Pal (1998) to see the effect of
the nationality of private firms on the endogenous role of the public firm. We find that the
results are the same in two cases: (i) there are only two time periods for quantity choice, and
(ii) there are more than two time periods for quantity choice and there are more than two
private firms; but quite different when there are more than two time periods for quantity
choice and there are only one or two private firms.
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1. Introduction 
Endogenous order of moves is an important issue in a pure private oligopoly and in a 
mixed  oligopoly  as  well.  In  the  literature  on  mixed  oligopoly,  Pal  (1998)  analyzed 
endogenous order of moves in quantity choice in a mixed oligopoly consisting of a single 
public  firm  and  N  domestic  private  firms.  Matsumura  (2003)  considered  endogenous 
roles of firms in a mixed duopoly consisting of a state-owned public firm and a foreign 
private firm. Lu (2006) discussed endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly with both 
domestic and foreign private firms in the linear demand case. 
Given the results in Pal (1998), Jacques (2004) and Lu (2007), the last two of which 
slightly  correct  Proposition  4.1  in  the  first  paper,  it  is  interesting  to  investigate 
endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly consisting of a single public firm and foreign 
competitors. What is the effect of the nationality of private firms on the endogenous role 
of  the  single  public  firm?  This  is  exactly  what  we  do  in  this  paper  by  adopting  the 
observable  delay  game  of  Hamilton  and  Slutsky  (1990)  in  the  context  of  a  quantity 
setting  mixed  oligopoly  where  the  firms  first  choose  the  timing  of  choosing  their 
quantities.   
Using a general demand function, Matsumura (2003) discussed a mixed duopoly 
case  in  which  there  are  only  two  possible  time  periods  for  quantity  choice.  The 
differences between this paper and  Matsumura  (2003) are: (1) the number of foreign 
private firms can be more than one; (2) the number of possible time periods can be more 
than two; (3) we use a linear demand function in order to compare the results with those 
in Pal (1998), Jacques (2004) and Lu (2007). We find that the results are the same in two 
cases: (i) there are only two time periods for quantity choice, and (ii) there are more than 
two time periods for quantity choice and there are more than two private firms; but quite 
different when there are more than two time periods for quantity choice and there are 
only one or two private firms. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model. 
Section 3 presents the results when there are only two possible time periods for quantity 
choice. The SPNEs are presented in Section 4 when there are more than two possible 
time periods to be chosen. Section 5 closes the paper. 
 
2. The model 
Consider a mixed oligopoly model consisting of one single public firm and N ( 1 ≥ ) 
foreign private firms, all producing a single homogenous product. Let 0 q   and  i q   (i=1, 








= +∑ denote the aggregate quantity. The market price is determined by the 
inverse demand function Q a p − = .   
To make the results in this paper directly comparable to those of Pal (1998), Jacques 
(2004) and Lu (2007), we make the same assumptions except that the nationality of the 
private  firms  is  different.  Specifically,  the  following  assumptions  are  made:  (1)  a  is 
sufficiently large; (2) All foreign private firms have constant and identical marginal costs 
of production, which are normalized to 0; (3) The public firm has a positive, constant 
marginal cost of production,  0 > c ; (4) Fixed costs are zero for all firms; (5) The public 
firm’s objective is to maximize domestic social surplus defined as the sum of consumer   2 
surplus and its profit, whereas each foreign private firm’s objective is to maximize its 
own profit. 
We  consider  the  observable  delay  game  of  Hamilton  and  Slutsky  (1990)  in  the 
context of a quantity setting mixed oligopoly where firms first announce at which time 
they will choose their quantities and are committed to this choice before they actually 
choose their quantities. There are  2 M ≥   possible time periods for quantity choice and 
each firm may choose its quantity in only one of those M periods.   
The  objective  functions  of  the  public  firm  and  foreign  private  firm  i   are 
respectively given by 
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Our  objective  is  to  solve  the  SPNEs  of  this  extended  quantity  setting  mixed 
oligopoly game. We restrict our attention to symmetric equilibria in which all firms of the 
same type choose to produce in the same period. First, we derive the results for two time 
periods (M=2). Next, we present the results for more than two time periods. 
 
3. Results for two time periods ( 2 M = ) 
First, we prove that the public firm will not produce simultaneously with all foreign 
private firms. This is stated in the following proposition. 
Proposition 3.1: All firms producing simultaneously in the same time period cannot be 
sustained as a SPNE outcome.
1 
 
This proposition is the same as Proposition 3.1 in Pal (1998) except that the private 
firms in Pal’s model are domestic and also the same as Lemma 3.1 in Lu (2006) except 
that there is no domestic private firm in our work. It implies that this result is robust 
regardless of the type of private firms in the market. 
Given  Proposition  3.1  and  that  we  restrict  our attention  to  symmetric  equilibria, 
there are two possible equilibria when M=2: one involves all private firms producing 
simultaneously in period 1 and the public firm producing in period 2, while in the other 
possible equilibrium, the public firm produces in period 1 and all private firms produce 
simultaneously in period 2.  We show that the former possible equilibrium is really a 
SPNE for any N while the latter one is a SPNE only when 2 N ≤ . 
 
Proposition 3.2: If 3 N ≥ , there is a unique SPNE, at which the private firms produce in 
period 1 and the public firm produces in period 2. If 2 N ≤ , then there is a second SPNE 
in which the public firm produces in period 1 and all private firms produce in period 2. 
 
One  might  wonder  why  Proposition  3  in  Matsumura  (2003)  states  there  exists  a 
unique SPNE in which the public firm produces in period 1 and all private firms produce 
in period 2 while we identify two SPNEs for the same mixed duopoly. The reason is that 
Matsumura restricts his attention to the equilibria which are not supported by weakly 
                                                       
1  All proofs are in the appendix.   3 
dominated strategies. We can check that for a mixed duopoly case (N=1), the additional 
SPNE identified in Proposition 3.2 is indeed supported by a weakly dominated strategy. 
 
Comparing  the  results  of  this  section  with  those  in  Pal  (1998),  we  find  that  the 
endogenous order of moves is actually the same. It seems that the nationality of private 
firms does not affect the endogenous timing. However, this is not completely true when 
there are more than two time periods for quantity choice. 
 
4. Main Results for more than two periods ( 2 M > ) 
Proposition 4.1: If 2 M > , then 
(1)  when 3 N ≥ ,  there  is  a  unique  SPNE,  at  which  all  private  firms  produce 
simultaneously in period 1 and the public firm produces in a subsequent period. 
(2)  when 2 N = ,  there  is  a  second  SPNE,  at  which  the  public  firm  produces  in  any 
period  except  the  last  one  and  the  two  private  firms  produce  in  the  subsequent 
period. 
(3)  when 1 N = , there are two SPNEs. In one SPNE, the private firm produces in period 
1 and the public firm produces in the last period; in the other SPNE, the public firm 
produces  in  any  period  except  the  last  one  and  the  private  firm  produces  in  a 
subsequent period. 
 
Comparing the results of this section with those in Pal (1998), Jacques (2004) and Lu 
(2007), we find that the endogenous order of moves is actually the same when 3 N ≥   but 
quite different when 2 N ≤ . When 2 N = , we still have the same SPNE as in Pal (1998), 
but we also have a second SPNE at which the public firm produces in any period except 
the last one and the two private firms produce in the subsequent period. When 1 N = , we 
still have two SPNEs but they are totally different from Jacques (2004) and Lu (2007). 
The reason is simple. That is because the public firm prefers to be a leader when private 
firms are foreign while it prefers to be a follower when competing with domestic private 
firms. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we investigate endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly consisting of 
one single public firm and N ( 1 ≥ ) foreign private firms by considering the observable 
delay game of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) in the context of a quantity setting mixed 
oligopoly. We find that the results are the same when there are only two time periods for 
quantity choice and when there are more than two time periods for quantity choice and 
there are more than two private firms but quite different when there are more than two 
time periods for quantity choice and there are one or two private firms. This difference is 
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In the following proofs, we let
*
0 q , 
* Q   and 
* p respectively denote the public firm’s 
quantity,  the  total  quantity  and  the  price  in  equilibrium  for  any  given  timing,  and 
*
f q denote a foreign private firm’s quantity for  any  given timing in  which all foreign 
private firms produce in the same period. When we consider whether a foreign private 
firm has the incentive to deviate from any given timing, we always choose foreign private 
firm  1  to  be  the  defector.  If  foreign  private  firm  1  deviates,  we  let 
*
1 q   denote  the 
defector’s quantity, and 
*
i q   (i=2, 3,…, N) denote the quantity of those foreign private 
firms who do not defect. 
If all firms produce simultaneously in period  t(=1, 2), then every firm’s payoff 
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∂ ∑ , for  1,2,..., i N = .              (A2) 
Solving  these  equations  gives  us
*
0 q a c = −   and 
* /( 1) f q c N = + .  It  follows  that 
* /( 1) Q a c N = − + , 
* /( 1) p c N = + ,  ( )
* 2 2 2 2 /2 2 2 1 / 2( 1) SS a ac N N c N   = − + + + +   ,  and 
* 2 2 /( 1) f c N π = + . 
 
Proof of Proposition 3.1 
We can show that either the public firm or a foreign private firm has the incentive to 
deviate if all firms produce simultaneously in the same period, that is, deviate from the 
following two cases. 
Case 1.1: All firms produce simultaneously in period 1. 
Consider foreign private firm 1 deviating to be a follower. Then in period 2, it will 
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  ∑   and  the  first  order  condition  (A.2) 
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and the public firm’s objective function is 
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The  first  order  conditions  imply  ( )
*
0 4 2 1 q a Nc N = − +   and 
* 4 /(2 1) i q c N = + ( 2,..., i N = ).  It  follows  that
*
1 2 /(2 1) q c N = +
* 2 /(2 1) Q a c N = − + , 
* 2 /(2 1) p c N = + , and 
* 2 2 2 2
1 4 /(2 1) /( 1) c N c N π = + > + . Therefore, foreign private firm 
1 has the incentive to deviate.   
Case 1.2: All firms produce simultaneously in period 2. 
Consider the public firm deviating to be a leader. Then in period 2, (A.2) implies 
( ) ( ) 0 1 i q a q N = − + . It follows that in period 1, the public firms’ objective function is 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2




SS a Na q N Na q N N a q N cq     = + + − + + − − + −     .   
The  first  order  condition  implies ( ) ( )
2 *
0 1 2 1 q a N c N = − + + .  It  follows  that 
( )
* 1 /(2 1) f q N c N = + + ,  ( )
2 * 2 2 1 /(2 1) f N c N π = + + , 
( ) [ ] ( )
2 * 2 2 2 2 2 2 /2 1 / 2(2 1) /2 2 2 1 / 2( 1) SS a ac N c N a ac N N c N   = − + + + > − + + + +  . Therefore, 
the public firm has the incentive to deviate. ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 3.2 
(1)  We  prove  that  the  possible  equilibrium  in  which  all  private  firms  produce 
simultaneously in period 1 and the public firm produces in period 2 is really a SPNE for 
any N by showing that no firm has the incentive to deviate. 
First we obtain the equilibrium quantities, price and each firm’s payoff in this possible 
equilibrium.  In  period  2,  (A.1)  implies
*
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conditions  imply 
* /( 1) f q c N = + .  It  follows 
that ( )
* 2 2 2 2 /2 2 2 1 / 2( 1) SS a ac N N c N   = − + + + +   ,  and 
* 2 2 /( 1) f c N π = + .  Clearly  the 
public firm has no incentive to deviate since the social surplus would be the same if it 
deviated to produce simultaneously with all the foreign private firms in period 1. 
Now consider foreign private firm 1 deviating to produce in period 2. (A.1) and (A.2) 
( 1 i = )  imply
*
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  ∑ .  In  period  1,  foreign  private  firm  i’s 
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  ∑   and the first order conditions imply 
* / i q c N = .  It  follows  that ( )
*
1 / 2 q c N = , 
* /(2 ) p c N = ,  and 
* 2 2 2 2
1 /4 /( 1) c N c N π = ≤ + (equal if and only  1 N = ). So no foreign private firm wants 
to deviate.    6 
(2) We prove that the possible equilibrium in which the public firm produces in period 1 
and all private firms produce simultaneously in period 2 is a SPNE only when 2 N ≤ . 
The equilibrium quantities, price and each firm’s payoff in this possible equilibrium have 
been obtained in the proof of proposition 3.1 (case 1.2),  ( ) ( )
2 *
0 1 2 1 q a N c N = − + + , 
( )
* 1 /(2 1) f q N c N = + + ,  ( )
2 * 2 2 1 /(2 1) f N c N π = + + , ( ) [ ]
2 * 2 2 /2 1 / 2(2 1) SS a ac N c N = − + + + . 
Clearly, the public firm has no incentive to deviate. 
Now consider foreign private firm 1 deviates to produce in period 1. (A.2) ( 2,..., i N = ) 
imply ( ) 0 1 / i q a q q N = − − .  In  period  1,  foreign  private  firm  1’s  profit  function  is 
( ) 1 1 0 1 / q a q q N π = − −   and the public firm’s objective function is 
( ) ( ) ( )
2
0 1 0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0
1 1 1 1
2
N a q q N a q q a q q N
SS a q a q q cq
N N N N
  − + + − + + − − −   = − − + − − −        
. 
The  first  order  conditions  imply ( )
* 2
0 2 3 1 q a N c N = − −   and ( )
* 2
1 3 1 q N c N = − .  It 
follows  that ( )
* 3 1 i q Nc N = − ( 2,..., i N = ),  ( )
* 3 1 p Nc N = − ,  and 
( )
2 * 3 2
1 / 3 1 N c N π = − which  is  lower  than  ( )
2 2 2 1 /(2 1) N c N + +   when  1 N = or  2  but 
higher when  3 N ≥ . ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 4.1: 
Firstly, clearly, simultaneous play cannot be sustained as a SPNE outcome.   
Secondly, private firms producing in period t(>1) while the public firm producing as 
a follower cannot be sustained as a SPNE outcome. To prove this, we list domestic social 
surplus in three different cases: (1) when the public firm produces simultaneously with all 
private firms, ( ) ( )
2 2 2 2 /2 2 2 1 / 2 1 SS a ac N N c N   = − + + + +  ; (2) when the public firm 
produces as a leader of all private firms,  ( ) ( )
2 2 2 /2 1 / 2 2 1 SS a ac N c N = − + + +    ; (3) 
when  the  public  firm  produces  as  a  follower  of  all  private  firms, 
( ) ( )
2 2 2 2 /2 2 2 1 / 2 1 SS a ac N N c N   = − + + + +  . So the public firm prefers to be a leader. 
If private firms produce in period t(>1), the public firm will choose to produce in period 
1. 
Thirdly, if private firms produce in period 1 and the public firm produces in period t 
(2 t T ≤ < ), then we can show a foreign private firm has the incentive to deviate to be a 
follower of the public firm when 1 N =   but no incentive to do so when 2 N ≥ .
2  We can 
also  show  a  foreign  private  firm  has  no  incentive  to  deviate  to  produce  in  period  s 
(2 s t ≤ < ) when 3 t ≥ .
3  If private firms produce in period 1 and the public firm produces 
                                                       
2   Straightforward  calculation  yields  the  defector’s  profit  is ( )
* 2 2
1 4 / 9 c N π = ,  which  is  lower  than 
* 2 2 /( 1) f c N π = +   when 3 N ≥ , equal when 2 N = , but higher when 1 N = . 
3   Straightforward  calculation  yields  the  defector’s  profit  is ( )
* 2 2
1 / 4 c N π = ,  which  is  lower  than 
* 2 2 /( 1) f c N π = +   when  2 N ≥ , equal when 1 N = .   7 
in period T, then clearly no firm has the incentive to deviate. 
So far we have proved that if private firms want to be leaders of the public firm, they 
have  to  produce  in  period  1.  When  they  do  so,  the  public  firm  producing  in  any 
subsequent period when 2 N ≥   can be sustained as SPNE, while the public firm has to 
choose to produce in the last period when 1 N = . 
Fourthly, by Proposition 3.2, the public firm producing as a leader of all private 
firms cannot be sustained as SPNE when 3 N ≥ . 
Fifthly, if the public firm produces in period t(<T) and  2 N ≤   private firms produce 
in a subsequent period, then clearly the public firm has no incentive to deviate, and we 
can show that a private firm has no incentive to deviate to be a leader of the public firm 
when t>1, that a private firm has the incentive to deviate to be a leader of the other 
private firm when 2 N = except that private firms produce in the subsequent period, and 
that a private firm has no incentive to deviate if  1 N = .■ 
 
 
 